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Abstract
We propose an intuitive way of how to measure segregation in social and
spatial networks. Using random walks, we define the segregation index as
the probability that an individual meets an individual from the same social
group. The segregation index is a generalization of the isolation index and a
homophily index introduced in Currarini et al. (2009), and it has a closed–
form relation to PageRank that facilitates its computation. We also show
that the Spectral Segregation Index proposed by Echenique and Fryer (2007)
is not continuous with respect to the network structure. Finally, we apply the
measure to Spanish census data and to citations data from Economics, and
rationalize the index as the equilibrium outmode of a game.
Keywords: Isolation, Homophily, Network, PageRank, Markov Chain, Seg-
regation.
JEL–Numbers: C0, D85, Z13.
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1 Introduction
The objective of this study is to propose a new measure of residential segregation —
the degree to which social groups live apart —, which is important in order to assess
both the causes and consequences of social separation. For instance, Cutler et al. (2008)
analyze how cultural factors explain the differences in segregation across ethnic groups.
Also, residential segregation has a variety of effects on socio-economic variables and its
analysis is implicit in the design of integration policies.1
The most basic framework that addresses the question of how to measure residential
segregation starts with some geographic space (i.e., a city) that is divided into smaller
units called census tracts or neighborhoods. Also one takes the distribution of the different
social groups (the population can be partitioned using observable characteristics such as
ethnicity, religion, or nationality) over census tracts as given. Within this setting, the
classical work of Massey and Denton (1988) introduces the following five dimensions of
segregation: evenness, or the extent to which a group is distributed homogeneously over
neighborhoods; exposure, or the degree of potential contact to other groups; concentration,
or the amount of physical space a group occupies; centralization, or the degree to which
a group resides close to the city center; and clustering, or the extent to which individuals
from the same group tend to live in neighborhoods next to each other.
In a recent major contribution, Echenique and Fryer (2007) apply graph theory to
derive a measure of (residential) segregation that they call the Spectral Segregation Index
(SSI). The social interaction framework studied is based on the assumption that individ-
uals divide their time among their neighbors/friends, and the more time they spend with
individuals from their group, the more segregated the group as a whole is. The authors
then apply the SSI to the U.S. Census data from 2000 (replicating the results of Cutler
and Glaeser 1997 on ghettos and uncovering a high rank correlation with measures that
capture the dimensions of evenness and exposure) and to friendship networks in schools.
1See, among others, Benabou (1993), Borjas (1995), Boeri et al. (2012), Card and
Rothstein (2007), Cutler and Glaeser (1997), Edin et al. (2003), Kling et al. (2007) and
Zenou (2009).
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Our setting departs from Echenique and Fryer (2007) in several crucial aspects. First,
we allow multiple individuals to be located in the same node/neighborhood. Second, and
most importantly, the segregation of a group depends in our model on the distribution
of the other groups in all census tracts. The SSI , on the other hand, only considers
the information that is contained in the subgraph of the considered group; that is, all
individuals not belonging to the group in question are eliminated from the network.
Our approach is therefore fundamentally different from the SSI , and, in particular, it is
related to the following process: Pick any two individuals from a given group g at random
and suppose that the first of the two individuals moves over the network (city) in such a
way that in the first period, she advances from her area of residence to some neighboring
census tract. In each subsequent period, she either moves from her current position in
the network to some adjacent node (this event happens with probability 0 ≤ α < 1) or
the process stops (this event happens with probability 1 − α). Hence, the parameter α
can be interpreted as the degree of spatial mobility. The normalized segregation index for
group g, denoted by σ¯g, is then defined as the probability that the two randomly chosen
individuals meet when the random–walk of the first individual terminates.2,3
After formally introducing the segregation index, we show that the measure directly in-
corporates three of the five dimensions introduced by Massey and Denton (1988); namely
those of exposure, clustering, and centralization. First, the segregation index is a natural
spatial generalization of the isolation index (see, Lieberson 1981) to networks. In fact,
2People randomly meet friends, friends of friends, or higher–order acquaintances. Also,
socio-economic relationships are usually recursive, self–enforcing, and with feedback ef-
fects. For example, Jackson and Rogers (2007) show for several situations that a random
link formation process matches empirical networks very well.
3Since both individuals are chosen at random, the measure is controlling for group
sizes. It is also robust to the number of census tracts, the definition of the boundaries
of census tracts, and the population size. We nevertheless also define the group–size–
dependent measure σg according to which a randomly chosen individual will meet any
individual from the same group when the random walk terminates. All our theoretical
results hold for both the group–size–dependent and the normalized measure.
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σg reduces to the isolation index of group g if the socio–geographical network is empty
and individuals only interact in the neighborhoods they reside in (Proposition 1). Note
that while σg explicitly accounts for the intensity of interactions within group g, it is
nevertheless directly related to the level of interaction with other groups (exposure) as
well. This is because more intra–group interactions prevents the group from socializing
with others.
To see that the segregation index is also related to the dimension of clustering, suppose
that α = 0. In this case, the only interactions that matter are those with individuals from
neighboring census tracts, and the measure becomes equal to the average proportion of all
immediate neighbors that belong to the same group. Formally, Proposition 2 establishes
that for α = 0, the segregation index reduces to the homophily index introduced by
Currarini et al. (2009). Since social interactions with individuals who live further away
become more and more feasible as α increases, one can regard σg as a generalized measure
of homophily/clustering that incorporates social relations beyond immediate neighbors.
Third, the segregation index also takes into account the dimension of centralization
because groups that are closer to the socio–geographical center of the network are more
likely to interact with individuals from the same group everything else equal. The rele-
vance of centralization as a dimension of segregation has been reported in some countries
like the U.S., where socio-economic factors can cause minorities to move to the city cen-
ter. In particular, the spatial mismatch literature emphasizes that blacks who tend to
live closer to the city center have worse labor market outcomes (see, Ihlanfeldt and Sjo-
quist 1998 and Gobillon et al. 2007). Proposition 3 shows that the segregation index of a
group g is a weighted sum over the homophily indices of the nodes (the probability that a
neighbor belongs to the same group), where the weight assigned to each node is assessed
through the PageRank index used by Google to determine the importance of webpages
in the World Wide Web.4 Thanks to this connection to PageRank, we are able to show
4We also formally relate the segregation index to the dimension of evenness by showing
that the normalized isolation index is minimized if the individuals of a group are equally
distributed over all nodes (Proposition 4). However, uneven distributions can lead to
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how the segregation index can be easily implemented and efficiently calculated in regular
computers, even for a large number of census tracts. Implementation files and examples
can be found in the web appendix.
In the next step, we analyze a drawback of the SSI . We present an example showing
that the SSI is not continuous in the strength of the social ties because in situations
when two separated components of a network are merged by a new link, the SSI may
change abruptly. We believe, and argue in more detail in Section 4, that continuity is
a very important property because both social and geographical networks change over
time and are subject to a continuous addition and deletion of links. By considering the
network structure we maintain the postulate of Echenique and Fryer (2007) that segre-
gation is formed through social interactions, but we amend their drawback by developing
a continuous measure.
In the empirical analysis, we first explore the geographical close–knitness of foreign
residents in Spain in 2009. We find that the southern part of the Mediterranean coast
of Almer´ıa and the autonomous community of Catalonia are the most segregated areas,
while Galicia, the Basque Country, and Andalusia are the least segregated ones. Also,
the Pakistani and immigrants from Nigeria and Senegal are the most segregated groups,
while the Latin Americans turn out to be rather integrated. Given the known detrimental
effects of segregation on labor market outcomes (and therefore on income and other corre-
lated variables), this result suggests a proactive housing policy that targets in particular
immigrants from poor countries facing a language barrier. One final important feature
of the model is that it allows us to uncover network/clustering effects — the change in
the measure due to considering the network on top of the isolation index. These effects
are strong for the Pakistani and some groups from Africa, but weak for immigrants from
Western Europe.
To show that the theoretical model is flexible enough to address a wide range of dif-
ferent questions, we consider afterwards citation data for 140 leading Economics journals
(that are divided into 18 different fields) from 2010 to articles published in 2005–2009.
even lower levels of segregation as soon as the network is introduced.
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Letting α vary allows us again to uncover clustering in the underlying distribution. It
turns out that among the smaller fields without many self citations, Accounting and Sec-
torial Studies show strong network effects, which suggests the existence of citation circles
(journals from these fields cite journals from other fields, . . ., that cite journals from the
original field). This effect is not found in other fields of similar size (Human Resource
Management and Social Economics).
Our final theoretical contribution is the construction of a game–theoretical model
that rationalizes the segregation index. We use techniques similar to those developed in
Currarini et al. (2009), where individuals are involved in a search process and utilities
depend on whether they meet people who belong to the same or a different group. A
network of relationships arises as a consequence of these encounters. Ours is an essentially
different search model. Individuals search through a fixed spatial network and there is no
preference bias towards meetings with people from the same group. To be more concrete,
individuals have to decide how much time to invest in each of the groups/cultures and
then meet people from a neighboring node. We assume that there are two situations that
create benefits for an individual who invests in culture g: (a) her match also invests in
culture g and (b) her match belongs to group g. In the unique steady state equilibrium,
the average time invested by group g in its own culture is proportional to its segregation
index. The fact that the benefits from the meetings are type–independent highlights the
unbiased nature of the segregation index. In fact, since the level of interaction of any
individual of group g with her neighbors does not depend on her group, the segregation
index explains how the spatial setting alone can induce separation.
We proceed as follows. Next, we introduce the segregation index and relate it to the
various dimensions of segregation. In Section 4, we discuss the discontinuity of the SSI .
Section 5 presents the empirical results. In Section 6, we study the search model. Finally,
we conclude.
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2 The Segregation Index
Consider a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of n individuals. For simplicity, we will call N a society.
The individuals live in a city that is composed of a finite set M = {1, 2, . . . , m} of m
neighborhoods or census tracts. A particular neighborhood i ∈ M will also be referred
to as a node. It is assumed that every individual lives in exactly one neighborhood, but
that each neighborhood possibly inhabits multiple individuals. Also, there is a set G of
groups that forms a partition of the society. One can think of a group g ∈ G as a subset
of members of the society that share a particular attribute such as religion or ethnicity.
Let ng,i be the number of individuals of group g ∈ G that live in neighborhood i ∈ M .
The number of individuals belonging to group g ∈ G is ng =
∑
i∈M ng,i. Similarly,
ni =
∑
g∈G ng,i is the number of individuals that reside in neighborhood i ∈ M . The
column vectors cg = (ng,i/ni)i∈M and dg = (ng,i/ng)i∈M are referred to as the vectors of
group concentrations and group densities, respectively.
The different neighborhoods in a city are interconnected through links. Formally, A
is an m × m matrix such that ai,j = 1 if there is a connection between i and j, and
ai,j = 0 otherwise. The intuition is that two neighborhoods are connected if they are
geographically adjacent or if individuals from these neighborhoods directly interact with
each other.5 We assume that ai,i = 1 so that individuals from the same neighborhood
can directly interact with each other. Let ai = |{j ∈ M : ai,j = 1}| be the number of
neighborhoods i ∈M is connected to. An m×m matrix P is said to be a row stochastic
matrix associated with A whenever the following conditions hold: pi,j = 0 whenever
ai,j = 0, pi,j > 0 whenever ai,j = 1, and pi ≡
∑
j∈M pi,j = 1. With this notation at hand,
we can now formally define a city as a tuple C = 〈N,M,G, (ng,i)g∈G,i∈M ,P〉.
The advantage of working with a stochastic P is that it provides a natural in-
terpretation in terms of node–to–node transition probabilities. A walk is a sequence
5There is no need to assume that the graph is symmetric. Asymmetric graphs occur,
for instance, when A represents a social communication structure. Also, friendship net-
works are not necessarily symmetric. Finally, the mobility between two different social
strata could be more sticky depending on the direction of movement.
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ω = (ω0, ω1, ω2, . . .) of at least two, possibly repeated neighborhoods with the restriction
that two consecutive neighborhoods must be connected. We assume that in period t = 0,
a walk passes from the initial neighborhood ω0 to some adjacent neighborhood ω1. In ev-
ery subsequent period t = 1, 2, 3 . . ., a walk continues with probability α ∈ [0, 1) from the
current position ωt to an adjacent neighborhood ωt+1, and stops with probability 1 − α.
In case of continuation, the walk currently at neighborhood i passes to j with probability
pi,j. Formally, a random–walk is a random variable whose realization is a particular walk
ω, where the probability of a walk ω = (ω0, ω1, . . . , ωl) of length |ω| = l conditional on
the initial node being ω0 is
Prob(ω|ω0) = α
(l−1) (1− α) pω0,ω1 pω1,ω2 · · · pωl−1,ωl.
For example, conditional on that w0 = 4, the walk ω = (4, 3, 2) occurs with probability
p4,3 · α · p3,2 · (1 − α). Since α < 1, any realization ω of a random–walk has finite length
with probability 1. Let Ω be the set of all possible realizations of ω. The expected walk
length E(l) is6
E(l) =
∞∑
l=1
l
∑
ω∈Ω:|ω|=l
Prob(ω|ω0) =
1
1− α
.
This equation shows that α is related to the expected walk length, and can thus be
interpreted as the degree of spatial mobility. For instance, if α = 0.85, then E(l) = 6.67.
Similarly, if α = 0.99, then E(l) = 100.7
6To see this, note that since every node has an out–link (ai > 0), the expected length
of a walk is independent of its origin. Now, take any initial node ω0. The random–walk
moves to ω1 with probability one. But the random–walk starting at ω1 has, due to the
independence of the origin, an expected length of α times E(l). Hence, E(l) = 1+αE(l).
7It is important to note that the model parameter α gives raise not just to a single
measure but to a family of measures, one for each α. This allows us to analyze the
phenomenon of segregation as a function of the spatial mobility. In particular, it will
become clear in the empirical analysis that a comparison of the degree of the segregation
for different α uncovers group clustering (network effects).
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Given the transition matrix P and the continuation probability α ∈ [0, 1), let Q be
the m ×m matrix such that qi,j is the probability that a walk ends in neighborhood j,
given that it started in i. Our first objectives is to provide a closed–form expression of
Q in terms of the parameters P and α, yet it is already easy to see that (a) if P = I,
no interaction takes place across neighborhoods, (b) if P 6= I and α = 0, no interaction
takes place beyond immediate neighbors, and (c) if P 6= I and α tends to 1, the expected
walk length grows arbitrarily large.
Lemma 1. Q = (1− α)(I− αP)−1P.
Proof. See the corresponding section.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. In order to compute qi,j, we have to consider
all walks of the form ω = (i, ω1, ω2, . . . , j). If q
[l]
i,j denotes the probability that j is reached
in exactly l steps from i, then
qi,j =
∞∑
l=1
q
[l]
i,j = (1−α) pi,j+α(1−α)
∑
ω1∈M
pi,ω1 pω1,j+α
2(1−α)
∑
ω1,ω2∈M
pi,ω1 pω1,ω2 pω2,j+. . .
or, in matrix notation,
Q = (1− α)P+ α(1− α)P2 + α2(1− α)P3 + . . .
= (1− α) (I+ αP+ α2P2 + . . .)P
= (1− α)(I− αP)−1P.
We can now suggest a measure of residential segregation that is related to the level
of within–group interactions, taken into account through the matrix Q. The segregation
index σg of group g ∈ G is defined as the probability that a randomly chosen individual
of group g meets another individual from the same group in the neighborhood where her
random–walk terminates.
Definition 1. Given city C = 〈N,M,G, (ng,i)g∈G,i∈M ,P〉 and the continuation probabil-
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ity α ∈ [0, 1), the segregation index of group g ∈ G is
σg(C, α) =
∑
i∈M
dg,i
∑
j∈M
qi,j cg,j = d
T
gQcg.
Since σg is a probability, it takes values from the interval [0, 1]. To see that the
measure is increasing in the relative size ng/n of group g, take any city C and consider
the city Cˆ that can be obtained from C by doubling the concentration of individuals
of group g in each neighborhood maintaining the total population in each neighborhood
constant. Thus, dˆg = dg, cˆg = 2 cg and Qˆ = Q, which implies that σg(Cˆ, α) = 2 σg(C, α).
Consequently, the segregation of group g has doubled simply because the group has
grown but not because its distribution over the network has changed. The reason for
this dependence is that it is only required that an individual meets any (and not a
randomly chosen) individual from the same group. This effect can be accounted for with
the following normalization.
Definition 2. Given city C = 〈N,M,G, (ng,i)g∈G,i∈M ,P〉 and the continuation probabil-
ity α ∈ [0, 1), the normalized segregation index of group g ∈ G is
σ¯g(C, α) =
(ng
n
)−1
σg(C, α) =
(ng
n
)−1
dTgQcg.
If group g is distributed homogeneously over all neighborhoods (for all i ∈ M , cg,i =
ng/n), then σg(C, α) = ng/n and σ¯g(C, α) = 1. So if σ¯g(C, α) > 1, group g is on average
overrepresented in census tracts compared to its overall population share. The size–
independence of the normalized measure becomes even more visible if it is rewritten as
follows:
σ¯g(C, α) = n
∑
i∈M
dg,i
∑
j∈M
n−1j qij dg,j.
According to this equation, σ¯g is equal to the probability (up to the multiplicative
scalar n) that a randomly chosen individual from group g meets another randomly chosen
individual from the same group. The fact that both individuals are chosen at random
prevents this probability from depending on the representativeness of the group in the
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society. Finally, the segregation index of city C is defined as the weighted average over
the segregation indices of the groups; that is, σ(C, α) =
∑
g∈G ng/n ·σg(C, α). Intuitively,
σ(C, α) is the probability that a randomly chosen individual (of all groups) meets an
individual from the same group when her random–walk terminates. The normalized
segregation index σ¯(C, α) of city C is defined accordingly.
3 Properties
3.1 Exposure
Isolation, the opposite of exposure, is the degree of potential contact or interaction be-
tween members of the same group. This notion is captured through the isolation index,
which is defined as the likelihood that a typical individual of a group faces a member
from the same group in her own neighborhood:
Ig(C) =
∑
i∈M
dg,i cg,i = d
T
g cg.
The normalized isolation index is then I¯g(C) = (ng/n)
−1Ig(C). Our first proposition
directly relates the segregation to the isolation index.
Proposition 1. Given city C = 〈N,M,G, (ng,i)g∈G,i∈M ,P〉 and the continuation proba-
bility α ∈ [0, 1), the segregation index of group g ∈ G is
σg(C, α) = (1− α)d
T
g (I− αP)
−1Pcg.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Lemma 1 and Definition 1.
Proposition 1 shows that the segregation index reduces to the isolation index whenever
the network is empty (P = I). Our measure can also be interpreted as a weighted average
over the entries of the vector vg ≡ Qcg = (1−α)(I−αP)
−1Pcg, where the weight of each
neighborhood i ∈ M is equal to dg,i. Since vg contains the contributions of all census
tracts to the segregation of group g, we will call it the vector of local segregations of group
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g. In particular, vg,i is the expected concentration of group g in the neighborhood where
a random–walk that started in neighborhood i terminates. We conclude with an example.
Example. Consider the city C depicted in Figure 1.
[Include Figure 1 about here]
There are two ethnic groups, blacks and whites. Two whites reside in neighborhoods
1 and 3, three whites in neighborhood 4, and one white in neighborhood 2. Moreover,
three blacks live in neighborhood 3 and one black in neighborhoods 1, 2 and 4 each.
The transition matrix P in Figure 1 is such that for all i, j ∈ M , pi,j = ai,j/ai. Since
dTblacks = (1/6, 1/6, 1/2, 1/6), d
T
whites = (1/4, 1/8, 1/4, 3/8), c
T
blacks = (1/3, 1/2, 3/5, 1/4),
and cTwhites = (2/3, 1/2, 2/5, 3/4), it is easy to verify that σblacks(C, 0.85) = 0.45 and
σwhites(C, 0.85) = 0.55. The normalized measures are equal to σ¯blacks(C, 0.85) = 1.05 and
σ¯whites(C, 0.85) = 0.97, respectively. 
3.2 Clustering
Following Massey and Denton (1988) clustering is the extent to which individuals from
the same social groups live in neighborhoods next to each other.8 It is rather intuitive that
the segregation index incorporates clustering in the proper definition: An individual who
starts a random–walk in her area of residence is more likely to end up in a neighborhood
that is closer to her own census tract than in a neighborhood that is further away as soon
P 6= I. To say it differently, two individuals are more likely to meet the closer they live to
each other. Figure 2 visualizes this effect. Since for all α ∈ [0, 1), q4,5(A, α) > q2,5(B, α)
and q5,4(A, α) > q5,2(B, α), the segregation of the blacks is higher in City A than in City
B. According to Massey and Denton (1988), this is entirely due to clustering.9
8In the literature on social networks, clustering refers to the probability that two
neighbors of a given individual have a direct link between themselves. The two concepts
have to be carefully distinguished.
9They write on page 293: “..., suppose we have two urban areas with the same number
of minority members, who comprise the same proportion of the total population. In each
13
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[Include Figure 2 about here]
From a formal point of view, we establish that the segregation index captures the
dimension of clustering by showing that it naturally extends the homophily measures
developed in Currarini et al. (2009). The concept of homophily in social networks reflects
the propensity of individuals to be directly linked to other individuals of the same type.
In particular, the homophily index hg(C) of group g ∈ G in city C is the expected fraction
of individuals in neighboring census tracts who belong to the same group:
hg(C) =
∑
i∈M
dg,i
∑
j∈M
ng,j ai,j∑
k∈M
nk ai,k
.
As usual, we define the normalized homophily index as h¯g(C) = (ng/n)
−1hg(C). In the
example corresponding to Figure 2, hblacks(A) = 1/2 · (2/3 + 1) = 5/6 and hblacks(B) =
1/2 · (1/3 + 1/2) = 5/12 — the homophily index for the blacks is higher in City A. Our
next proposition shows that if α = 0 and the transition probabilities are proportional
to the sizes of the neighborhoods, the segregation index coincides with the homophily
index. Consequently, the segregation index can be interpreted as a generalized measure
of homophily that reaches beyond immediate neighbors for strictly positive α.
Proposition 2. If pi,j = (ai,j nj)/(
∑
k∈M ai,k nk) for all i, j ∈M , then σg(C, 0) = hg(C).
Proof. See the corresponding section.
place, no minority member shares a common residential area with a majority member, all
minority areas are located the same average distance from the central business district,
and all areas are of the same geographic size. In this case, both urban areas would display
identical measures of evenness, exposure, concentration, and centralization. However,
if all minority areas in one of the urban areas were contiguous to one another, but in
the other area they were separated from one another, then we would probably consider
the former urban area to be more segregated, since all minority members live within one
single homogeneous ghetto, compared to the latter area, where they reside in minority
neighborhoods that are scattered throughout the urban area.”
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3.3 Centralization
Generally speaking the centrality of a node in a network captures its well–connectedness.
Depending on the specific context, it can for example be assessed using the notions of
degree (the number of connections a node has), betweenness (determine the shortest
paths between any two nodes and calculate then, for each node, to how many of these
shortest paths it belongs to), or closeness (the mean geodesic distance between a node
and all nodes reachable from it). In our case, the segregation index belongs to the class
of eigenvector–based centrality measures and, in particular, it is related to the PageRank
index of Brin and Page (1998) that underlies Google’s search engine.10
The main idea of the PageRank vector is that a webpage is more important when
it is linked by other relevant pages. This idea is formalized with a finite Markov chain
according to which an individual “surfs” randomly over the web. The entries of the
PageRank vector are then just the stationary probabilities of this process. More formally,
an individual starts at any node (webpage) and surfs the web randomly according to the
(column–stochastic) matrix S that represents the actual links of the web. Additionally, at
any point in time, the surfer is “teleported” to a different page (even if the current page i is
not directly linked with it) with probability 1−β, while she continues her random–walk by
crossing links normally following ST with probability β. In case of teleportation, the surfer
is taken to page j with probability rj . The vector r = (ri)i∈M is the personalizaction vector
of the PageRank index summarizing the teleporting mechanism. This process defines a
Markov chain whose stationary probabilities are gathered in the PageRank vector, the
principal eigenvector of the matrix (1− β)r1T + βS.
This notion of centrality can be straightforwardly adapted to our framework: An
individual from group g ∈ G randomly walks in the city according to the transition
matrix P (that is, S = PT) and is teleported to node j with probability (1−α) dg,j (that
is, β = α and r = dg).
Definition 3. Given the city C = 〈N,M,G, (ng,i)g∈G,i∈M ,P〉 and the continuation prob-
ability α ∈ [0, 1), the PageRank vector wg of group g ∈ G is the principal eigenvector of
10See Wasserman and Faust (1994) for an excellent overview of centrality measures.
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the matrix (1− α)dg1
T + αPT.
Note that wg captures the centrality of the nodes for group g. It is group–dependent
because the personalization vector r is set equal to the density vector dg of group g. Thus,
in the PageRank model, wg,i is the stationary probability of neighborhood i when telepor-
tation takes place according to dg, and it accounts for the reachability of neighborhood
i by members of group g. Our next proposition is the dual of Proposition 1.
Proposition 3. The segregation index of group g is equal to σg(C, α) = w
T
gPcg.
Proof. See the corresponding section.
Proposition 3 shows that individuals who are more central in the sense of PageRank
contribute more to the overall segregation of their group because they are easier to reach
by other group members. Also, if pi,j = (ai,j nj)/(
∑
k∈M ai,k nk) for all i, j ∈M (i.e., tran-
sition probabilities are proportional to the sizes of the neighborhoods as in Proposition
2), then σg(C, α) = w
T
g hg, where
hg,i =
∑
j∈M
ng,j ai,j∑
k∈M nk ai,k
is the homophily index of neighborhood i ∈M for group g ∈ G. This equation highlights
the interaction between the position of a neighborhood in the network (centrality) and
its clustering (homophily): In the computation of σg(C, α), the homophily index hg,i of
neighborhood i ∈ M is weighted by its PageRank index wg,i. Note also that wg = dg
if the network is empty (P = I) or if there is no spatial mobility beyond one’s own
neighborhood (α = 0). In the first case, σg reduces to the isolation index (because hg,i is
then equal to cg,i). In the second case, σg becomes equal to the homophily index. But
if network effects are present (P 6= I and α > 0), groups that are located more central
in the network everything else equal have a higher possibility of intra–group interactions
and, as a consequence, a higher segregation index.11 This is made visible with the help
11There is a vast literature that recognizes the importance of centrality in determin-
ing socio-economic outcomes. Examples include eduction (Calvo-Armengol et al. 2009),
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of the following example.
Example. Consider the city C depicted in Figure 3.
[Include Figure 3 about here]
There are eleven individuals belonging to three ethnic groups (blacks, whites, and
squares). There is exactly one individual in each neighborhood. The particularity of the
network structure is that the blacks and the whites are allocated in a very similar way.
Every black is connected to two other blacks plus herself, one white, and one square.
Every white is also connected to two other whites plus herself, one black, and one square.
The important difference is that all blacks are connected to the same square (individual
11), while two whites are connected to square 9 and two whites to square 10. Square 11 is
thus the most central individual of her group, which implies that the blacks are relatively
more central.
Since Iblacks(C) = Iwhites(C) = 1 and hblacks(C) = hwhites(C) = 3/5, both groups are
equally isolated and clustered. Hence, σg(C, α) incorporates the difference between the
two groups entirely through the PageRank vectors. Straightforward computations yield
that σblacks(C, 0.85) = 0.48 > 0.47 = σwhites(C, 0.85).
12

We complete this part of the analysis with an important comment regarding the imple-
mentability of the segregation index in real–life applications. The computation of σg is
simple and very fast, even for large matrices. One can apply first a simple iterative power
method to compute the PageRank vector wg, and then Proposition 3 to compute the
criminal behavior (Haynie 2001), worker’s performance (Mehra et al. 2001), power in
organizations (Brass 1984), and the formation and performance of R&D networks (Boje
and Whetten 1981, Powell et al. 1996 and Uzzi 1997).
12Section 4 shows that the Spectral Segregation Index (SSI) does not relate directly
to the dimension of centralization because it only considers the network of within–group
interactions. In the example, it misses that the blacks are connected to a more central
square than the whites.
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product wTgPcg. To calculate wg, one departs from a randomly chosen probability vector
w
(0)
g (that is, w
(0)
g,i ≥ 0 for all i ∈M and
∑
i∈M w
(0)
g,i = 1) and then iterates by calculating
w
(t+1)
g = (1− α)dg + αP
Tw
(t)
g for all t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The asymptotic convergence rate of
this iterative power method is equal to α, see Langville and Meyer (2006). For example,
if α = 0.85, α50 ≈ 0.00296; that is, one expects at least 2-3 places of accuracy after only
50 iterations. 13 We include a description of the algorithm forMathematica and examples
in the web appendix.
3.4 Evenness
Evenness refers to how equal the individuals of a given group are spread over the city.
Formally, we say that the distribution of group g is even if for all i ∈ M , dg,i = ni/n, or
equivalently, cg,i = ng/n. In this case, σ¯g(C, α) = (ng/n)
−1dTgQcg = d
T
gQ1 = d
T
g 1 = 1
independently of the network structure. This calculation shows that we can use a unit-
normalized segregation index as a benchmark level in the sense that uneven distributions
will lead to a higher or lower normalized segregation. If σ¯g(C, α) > 1, group g is on
average overrepresented in neighborhoods. It is underrepresented whenever σ¯g(C, α) <
1. We show next that no group can on average be underrepresented if the isolation
index is applied. Hence, in this case, there is an immediate connection between uneven
distributions and a high segregation when the network does not matter.
13Note that P is a sparse matrix meaning that the number of non–zero entries in
each row is negligible. Thus, for large datasets (over 5,000 nodes), it is key to work
with special data structures representing sparse matrices (sparse function in Matlab and
SparseArray function in Mathematica). Otherwise, one spends a considerable amount
of memory space to store zeroes that do not affect matrix multiplications. Also, in
order to compute σg, it is not necessary to determine all connected components even
though the measure is component–separable by definition. Finally, σg has an additional
computational advantage over the SSI : The convergence speed of the SSI can be very
low compared to that of σg, which is high if α is well below 1.
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Proposition 4. For all cities C = 〈N,M,G, (ng,i)g∈G,i∈M ,P〉, all continuation probabil-
ities α ∈ [0, 1), and all groups g ∈ G, I¯g(C) ≥ 1.
Proof. See the corresponding section.
Since individuals can interact in several neighborhoods as soon as the network mat-
ters, it becomes possible that a group is on average underrepresented (low segregation),
even if its distribution is uneven. The following example illustrates this effect.
Example. Consider the city depicted in Figure 4.
[Include Figure 4 about here]
Using the node–to-node transition matrix P one finds that the probabilities that the
random–walk terminates in a given neighborhood are equal to
dTblacksQ =
1
12 + 2α
(4 + 2α, 4, 4) and dTwhitesQ =
1
12 + 2α
(6, 3 + α, 3 + α).
We see that the black individual living in the city center is more likely to terminate her
walk in her area of residence. Similarly, the black center is also more likely to absorb a
walk starting from the white edges. We then obtain that
σ¯blacks(C, α) =
12 + 6α
12 + 2α
≥ 1 and σ¯whites(C, α) =
18 + 6α
24 + 4α
< 1.
We stress that the normalized segregation of the whites is lower than one even though the
distribution of the group is uneven. This highlights the idea that an uneven distribution
can potentially make individuals hardly accessible by members of the same group. 
4 Discontinuity of the SSI
In this part of the paper, it is shown that the SSI proposed in Echenique and Fryer
(2007) is not continuous in the strength of the social ties. Even though cities do not
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experience abrupt changes in the short run, people may move within the city or change
their pattern of social interactions, and we therefore think that a measure of segregation
should behave in a stable way to these changes. Since the only difference in the primitives
between Echenique and Fryer (2007) and our model is that they assume a one–to–one
mapping between neighborhoods and individuals, it is assumed for the time being that
ni = 1 for all i ∈M .
14
Given the matrix P, the SSI for group g ∈ G is calculated by determining first the
subgraph Pg of P that only contains interactions between members of g. All individuals
belonging to a different group are eliminated from the network and, consequently, from the
matrixP. Such a subgraphPg ofP generally consists of more than one strongly connected
component, so the next step is to calculate the SSI for each component separately. In
particular, the SSI for group g in the (strongly connected) component Pg,γ of Pg —
denoted by SSI(Pg,γ) — is set equal to the spectral radius of the substochastic matrix
Pg,γ, the largest absolute value of the eigenvalues of Pg,γ.15 The segregation of a node
(individual) i in this component is denoted by SSIi(P
g,γ), and it is the i−th entry of
the principal eigenvector of the matrix Pg,γ, normalized so that the vector average is
SSI(Pg,γ). The segregation of group g is a weighted average over the segregation levels
of group g in all components of Pg. In particular,
SSI(Pg) =
∑
γ
dγg · SSI(P
g,γ),
where dγg = 1/ng ·
∑
i∈Pg,γ ng,i is the fraction of individuals from group g that live in
Pg,γ.16 Alternatively, the SSI of group g can also be expressed as the average over the
14The next section presents an extension of the SSI to a setting with multiple inhabi-
tants in the same node.
15For the sake of simplicity, given any such matrix Pg, we will also use Pg to refer to
the network corresponding to Pg. Formally, the subgraph Pg,γ is said to be a strongly
connected component of the network represented by Pg if Pg,γ is a network of maximal
size such that there is a path between any pair of its nodes.
16Proposition 13 in Echenique and Fryer (2007) shows that the SSI is approximately
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individual segregation levels:
SSI(Pg) =
1
ng
∑
γ
∑
i∈Pg,γ
SSIi(P
g,γ).
To see how the SSI is applied consider the panel on the left–hand side of Figure
5, which corresponds to the motivating example in Echenique and Fryer (2007). The
society in City 1 is composed of two groups, blacks and whites. Each dot represents
one individual. It is also assumed that individuals only interact with their horizontal
and vertical neighbors. So, individual (A,1) spends 50% of her time with each (A,2) and
(B,1) each. The subgraph Pblacks in City 1 consists therefore of two connected components
Pblacks,1 and Pblacks,2.
[Include Figure 5 about here]
The SSI for the blacks is determined by taking a weighted average over the spec-
tral radii of the two black connected components. The upper part of Table 1 shows
that SSI(Pblacks,1) = 0.72 and SSI(Pblacks,2) = 0.25. Since 80% of the blacks reside in
component 1 and 20% in component 2, the segregation of the blacks is SSI(Pblacks) =
0.8 · 0.72 + 0.2 · 0.25 = 0.63.
[Include Table 1 about here]
proportional to the probability that two individuals from the same social group meet
without leaving the subgroup network. Hence, the SSI is also related to a probability
but, at the same time, differs substantially from the segregation index. Indeed, for σg it
does not matter whether i meets somebody from a different group on his way to j, yet
the walks undertaken according to the SSI are restricted to within group interactions.
This important distinction can lead to substantial differences in applications; i.e., our
empirical analysis in the next section shows that the correlation between the segregation
index and the SSI can be rather low.
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To see that the SSI is not continuous in the entries of Pblacks suppose that the black
individuals (D,4) and (C,5) start communicating with each other 1% of their respective
times. It is irrelevant which neighbor(s) receive now relative less attention from (D,4)
and (C,5), for the sake of the example just suppose that this extra time is taken away
from the white neighbors. This small change in the network leads to City 2 on the
right–hand side of Figure 5, which has now a single component. As it can be seen in
the lower part of Table 1, the effect of this change on the segregation of the blacks is
substantial, SSI(Pblacks) increases from 0.63 to 0.72. In particular, the spectral radius of
the integrated component converges to the larger of the two spectral radii. Finally, one
also sees that the segregation levels of individuals (B,5) and (C,5) are now very close to
0, whereas they were 0.25 in City 1.
More formally, SSI(Pg) is discontinuous in Pg, as opposed to what is stated in Propo-
sition 5 in Echenique and Fryer (2007). This becomes evident when two connected com-
ponents of Pg are merged or when one component of Pg is split up.17 The reason for
the discontinuity is the component additivity attached to the measure: The SSI of a
connected component Pg,γ of Pg is defined as the spectral radius of the submatrix Pg,γ,
but the spectral radius of Pg —which is continuous in Pg— can generally not be averaged
over its components. In fact,
ρ(Pg) = max
γ
ρ(Pg,γ),
where ρ(·) denotes the spectral radius. So, the property of component additivity sacrifices
continuity. To restore the continuity of the SSI , one would therefore have to drop this
component additivity. However, in this case, the segregation of group g would be equal to
the largest (and not the average) segregation of all components of Pg, and the segregation
levels in all other components of Pg would be zero. So, if additivity is dropped, one
would still need to explain why this asymmetric outcome is a reasonable measure of
segregation.18
17However, we also note that problems still arise when Pg is connected but near dis-
connectedness. In that case, the SSI can still display very unstable behavior.
18Note that Proposition 5 on page 475 indicates continuity of SSI(Pg) in the entire
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There are several circumstances that can trigger the discontinuity problem of the
SSI . The reader should observe first that the disconnectedness of a group inside a social
network causes the SSI to be discontinuous. Thus, even if a city or social network is
connected, the assumption that all groups within this network are connected is likely to
be violated. Second, if several individuals live in a node, the majority rule employed in
Echenique and Fryer (2007) is a sensible choice to determine the representative individual
of a census tract. However, one cannot exclude the possibility that the majority group
in a node changes (even though the U.S. Census data revealed a considerable margin
in most districts) and that this causes two or more smaller components to merge into
one big component or vice versa, leading to the same discontinuity problems. Third,
even if no particular representativeness rule has to be considered because there is only a
single individual in each node, it could happen that one individual changes her location
in the spatial network, thus changing the network structure of her group by merging
previously separated components or separating previously integrated components. Hence,
the movement of a single individual can provoke a significant variation in the segregation
of her group. Finally, the definition of adjacent nodes in a spatial network is also likely
to become problematic if the measure is not continuous. Echenique and Fryer (2007)
reasonably assume that two census tracts are connected whenever their centroids are not
more than one kilometer away from each other. Yet, a small change in this distance
could potentially merge or separate components of some groups, triggering an abrupt
change in the segregation of these groups. Even though it turns out that the application
to the U.S. Census in Echenique and Fryer (2007) is robust with respect to this kind of
variation in the network, one cannot exclude the possibility that difficulties appear in
future applications with different datasets.
To conclude we point out that σg and σ¯g are continuous in all their arguments. In
particular, continuity with respect to α and P follows from the fact that P is stochastic
and that |α| < 1. Moreover, our measures are quite stable in applications since we
are choosing values of α well below 1. Finally, the next proposition provides an upper
network Pg, which is not true. Indeed, SSI(Pg) is continuous as long as Pg is connected.
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bound to the change in the segregation index when connections are modified. For that,
given two cities C = 〈N,M,G, (ng,i)g∈G,i∈M ,P〉 and C
′ = 〈N,M,G, (ng,i)g∈G,i∈M ,P
′〉
with a common distribution of individuals over nodes, let U be the subset of nodes whose
connection change across the two cities; that is, U = {i ∈ M : pi,j 6= p
′
i,j for some j ∈M}.
Proposition 5. The change in segregation index between C = 〈N,M,G, (ng,i)g∈G,i∈M ,P〉
and C ′ = 〈N,M,G, (ng,i)g∈G,i∈M ,P
′〉 is bounded above by
|σg(C
′, α)− σg(C, α)| ≤ max
i∈M
{cg,i}
2α
1− α
∑
j∈U
wg,j.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 6.5.1 in Langville and Meyer (2006) and Proposition
3.
5 Applications
5.1 Residential Segregation in Spain
We next apply the segregation index to the Spanish census tract data from January 2009.
Among the developed countries Spain is particularly interesting to look at because the
country attracted a lot of immigrants from many different parts of the world. During the
boom years in the beginning of the century it was easy for the young South Americans to
find a job in the construction or the (private) service sector because they were relatively
cheaper to hire and had the advantage of speaking the same native language. But also
immigrants from the Eastern European countries that recently entered the European
Union or Africa were attracted by the vast job opportunities in the labor market. These
combined effects led to the situation that more than 10% of the 45 million residents in
Spain in 2009 were foreigners.
[Include Table 2 about here]
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Table 2 presents the population shares of 27 nationalities in Spain.19 It can be seen
that the Romanians form the largest foreign group with 1.76% of the total population
followed by the Moroccans who account for 1.56% of the residents. The high number
Moroccans in Spain is of no surprise given their long tradition in the country. Next are
Ecuador (0.93%) and Colombia (0.65%). The Nigerians form the smallest foreign group
(0.09%) for which we have data.
The Spanish territory is officially divided into 52 provinces, 47 of those are on the
Iberian Peninsula. The remaining ones are the Balearic Islands in the Mediterranean
Sea, the Canary Islands in the Atlantic Ocean (2 provinces), and the autonomous cities
Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa. We abstain from incorporating Ceuta and Melilla in
our analysis because they are too small — each of the two cities has only about 75,000
residents, and very few of them are non–Africans. A list of all provinces can be found in
Table 3.
[Include Table 3 about here]
As of January 2009, the National Statistical Institute of Spain (INE) divides the 50
main provinces into a total of 35,757 census tracts. The mean number of residents per
census tract is 1,268.98, the corresponding standard deviation is 625.74. As in Echenique
and Fryer (2007), we use the geographical location of the centroids of the census tracts
to derive the network. In particular, we define two census tracts to be connected if the
distance between their centroids is less than 400 meters. A node has then on average
4.84 connections. The corresponding standard deviation is 5.48. Also, there are 16,908
19Our analysis excludes immigrants from Britain and Germany who amount to more
than 1% of the Spanish population because these groups can be expected to be less of
a “social problem” than poor migrants from Africa. Many of them are pensioners who
bought second homes in the coastal area of the Mediterranean Sea and it is not clear how
much time they actually spend in these residences. We are very grateful to an anonymous
referee for pointing out this effect.
25
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
?????????????????????399
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????
isolated nodes.20 In order to make consistent comparisons with the homophily index (see
Proposition 2), we set the transition probabilities equal to
pi,j =
ai,j nj∑
k∈M ai,k nk
,
which means than the transition probability to node j is proportional to the total popu-
lation in census tract j. Observe that our results remain identical if we choose pi,j = 1/ai.
5.1.1 Results
We first report on the normalized segregation index σ¯g(C, 0.85) for all provinces; that is,
C is defined by the borders of the provinces.21 Recall that only the normalized measure is
invariant to the relative group sizes, which is a crucial property if one wants to compare
the segregation of different nationalities.
[Include Figure 6 about here]
We can see from Figure 6 that the segregation index is rather low in some parts of
the autonomous communities of Galicia (provinces 15, 27, and 32), Asturias (province
20Even though the network is constructed from geographical positioning data, we nev-
ertheless proxy true social interactions. This is so because geographical proximity is
correlated to close relationships, despite the fact that the new era of information has
made weak social links less dependent on physical distance (see, Goldenberg and Levy
2009 and Mok et al. 2010). Also, our qualitative results remain identical for radii of 1,000
and 1,500 meters.
21The numerical results for α ∈ {0.00; 0.50; 0.85; 0.99} and the normalized isolation
index for all groups and all provinces are detailed in the online appendix. Setting the
continuation probability α equal to 0.85 is a prominent choice in applications related to
PageRank because in this way, relevant network effects are introduced, and the analysis
is not compromised with computation inefficiencies or ill–conditioned problems that can
appear if α grows closer to 1.
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33), and the Basque Country (provinces 01, 20, and 48) that are all in northern part
of Spain touching the Cantabrian Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. Also, some parts of
Andalusia such as Cadiz, Co´rdoba, Jae´n, and Seville (provinces 11, 14, 23, and 41) have
a segregation index that lies between 1.00 and 1.10. A substantial portion of the country
has a segregation index between 1.11 and 1.20. The central region close to the capital
Madrid (province 28), the second biggest city of Barcelona (province 08), the coastal sides
of Alicante (province 03) and Murcia (province 30), the Balearic and the Canarian islands
(provinces 07, 35, and 38), as well as Salamanca and Badajoz that touch the Portuguese
border (provinces 10 and 37) have a moderate segregation index. The segregation index
takes high values within other provinces of the autonomous community of Catalonia in
northeastern part of the country (for example provinces 17 and 43) and Teruel (province
44). It is highest in Almer´ıa (province 04).
Figure 6 uncovers how segregated different parts of the country are, but so far we have
not analyzed which groups are causing the results we see. To say it in different words, we
still have to investigate which groups are, on average, more segregated. We detail on this
by calculating the normalized segregation index for each of the 27 groups in the whole
country; that is, C consists now of all 35,757 census tracts. Again, α = 0.85.
[Include Figure 7 about here]
It can be seen in Figure 7 that the Spanish are by far the least segregated group.
Since the normalized segregation index for group g takes a value of one if cg,i = ng/n
for all nodes, this finding supports the interpretation that the Spanish are very evenly
distributed over all census tracts. Also, since the normalized segregation index is con-
siderably larger than one for all other nationalities, the foreign groups show the general
tendency to stick together.
The by far most segregated immigrants are the Pakistanis, σ¯PK(Spain, 0.85) = 23.56,
which implies that interactions within this group occur about 23 times more often than if
their members were uniformly spread. Immigrants from Russia and African countries like
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Nigeria and Senegal have a normalized segregation index between 10–15. The immigrants
of the South American countries are the most integrated ones, their segregation index
ranges from 2.28 for the Colombians to 5.99 for the Uruguayans. Finally, we can also say
why Almer´ıa is very segregated. In Almer´ıa, 4.3% of the population are Romanians (their
segregation index in this province is 2.67) and 5.9% are Moroccans (their segregation
index in this province is 3.94). Consequently, the segregation in Almer´ıa is high because
two of the largest groups of immigrants are overrepresented in this province.
5.1.2 Network Effects
One important question at this point is whether the incorporation of the network as an
additional dimension adds to our understanding of segregation. To investigate this, one
has to compare the normalized segregation index when α = 0.85 with the situation when
P = I and the measure reduces to the normalized isolation index. This comparison will
in particular reveal which nationalities cluster in neighborhoods close to each other. To
see this, imagine that the isolation index of group g is 1 (no individual outside of g is
living in a census tract with members of g). There are now two opposite scenarios to be
investigated as the network is introduced: The census tracts with inhabitants of group
g are spread evenly across the city or they are clustered in one particular area. If the
members of g live in evenly spread census tracts, new connections to neighboring census
tracts will increase the interactions with members outside of g and the segregation will
decrease. If, on the other hand, g forms a clustered group, the segregation of the group
will also decrease, but the effect will now be smaller because the new interactions are
more likely to be intra–group, as the neighboring nodes are populated by group g as well.
Hence, in this example the decrease in segregation due to an increase in α is lower for
clustered groups.
[Include Figure 8 about here]
Figure 8 calculates the degree by which the measure decreases when the network is
considered; that is, we calculate 1− σ¯g(C, 0.85)/I¯s(C). One sees that the network effect is
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substantial for some groups but negligible for others. The clearest effect can be identified
for the Pakistanis and the Nigerians. Considering the actual network P with α = 0.85
reduces the normalized isolation index of these groups by 40–60%. However, it is not
only the relative changes that matter. For example, the Russians have the fourth highest
normalized isolation index (I¯R(C) = 13.26), while they are the second most segregated
group when the network matters and α = 0.85. Actually, the network effects for the
Russians are rather low because the segregation index does not change much when the
network is incorporated. As mentioned before, the differences in the change of the measure
is due to clustering. The Russians are overrepresented in the coastal sides of Alicante
(province 03), Almer´ıa (province 04), Girona (province 17), Ma´laga (province 29), and
Tarragona (province 43), whereas the Pakistanis are spread over many cities, even though
they live very concentrated within these cities.22
[Include Figure 9 about here]
Finally, Figure 9 analyzes which part of the network effect is due to a change from
α = 0 (the normalized homophily index) to α = 0.85. In fact, the ratio between σ¯g(C, 0)−
σ¯g(C, 0.85) and I¯g(C) − σ¯g(C, 0.85) shows which percentage of the clustering is due to
connections beyond immediate neighbors. The data clearly reveals that the normalized
homophily index already captures most of the network effects. Nevertheless, there are
several group of immigrants for which higher-order relations explain between 20% and
40% of the overall network effect (e.g., French, Moroccans, Nigerians, Chinese, and
Pakistanis). We also note that almost 40% of the clustering of Spanish residents is
explained by higher-order relations.
22The British and the Germans that were excluded from our study because of the before
mentioned reasons show a very similar residence pattern to that of the Russians. They
live highly segregated in few areas, in particular in Alicante and the Balearic Islands, so
that their network effect is rather small. Actually, the British and the Germans are two
most segregated groups if α = 0.85 (the Pakistanis remain to be the most segregated
group if the normalized segregation index is applied).
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5.1.3 Correlation with the SSI
Next, we calculate the correlation between the SSI and the segregation index. Recall
that the basic idea behind the SSI is that individuals interact with their neighbors. If one
node corresponds to one individual, the set of neighbors naturally includes all nodes an
individual is connected to. We allow for multiple individuals in the same neighborhoods,
but the two frameworks become comparable if one defines the set of neighbors as all
those individuals that can be reached within one step. The within group substochastic
interaction matrix Pg for group g is thus defined as
pgi,j =
ai,j ng,j∑
k∈M ai,k nk
.
Hence, an individual from group g living in neighborhood i interacts with all g−members
that can be reached within one step with equal probability. As before, the SSI of group
g can then be defined as
SSI(Pg) =
∑
γ
dγg · SSI(P
g,γ).
Since the spectral radius for each connected component can be set equal to the weighted
average of the corresponding eigenvector, we obtain that
SSI(Pg) =
∑
γ
dγg
∑
i∈Pg,γ
dγg,i · SSIi(P
g,γ),
where dγg,i = ng,i/
∑
j∈Pg,γ ng,j is the fraction of individuals of group g from component γ
who live in neighborhood i. Rewriting this equation as
SSI(Pg) =
∑
γ
∑
i∈Pg,γ
dγg · d
γ
g,i · SSIi(P
g,γ) =
∑
i∈M
dg,i · SSIi(P
g,γ(i))
shows that the SSI can be envisioned as a weighted average over all neighborhoods.
Since the SSI is not invariant to group sizes, we have to compare it to the size de-
pendent version of the segregation index, which according to Proposition 1 is equal to
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σg(C, α) =
∑
i∈M dg,i vg,i. Consequently, we proceed by calculating the correlation be-
tween the vectors vg = (vg,i)i∈M and (SSIi(P
g,γ(i)))i∈M of size 35,757 corresponding to
Spain as a whole.
[Include Figure 10 about here]
Figure 10 shows a positive correlation between the SSI and the segregation index for
all nationalities. For several groups, the correlation ranges between 0.20 and 0.40. The
correlation is rather small for immigrants from Morocco, Chile and Bolivia. Consequently,
the data reveals that the SSI and the segregation are rather different in their structure
even though they both relate to the probability that two members from the same group
meet. This is because the measures use a different underlying network structure to
determine this kind of probability (see Footnote 16).
5.2 Segregation in Scientific Publications
5.2.1 Model
Using citation data from scientific publications, we now show that the model of residential
segregation can be readily applied to a wide range of socio-economic questions. Let the set
of nodes M now be equal to the set of scientific journals. The set of all fields G partitions
M . The number of articles published by journal i ∈ M constitutes the population ni at
node i. Since each journal is assumed to belong to exactly one field, cg,i = 1 if journal i
belongs to field g ∈ G, and cg,i = 0 otherwise. The total number of articles published by
journals from field g is then equal to ng =
∑
i∈M cg,i ni. Similarly, dg,i = (cg,i · ni)/ng is
the fraction of all articles from journals belonging to field g ∈ G that are published by
journal i. We can see that dg,i = 0 whenever journal i does not belong to field g.
Let li,j be the number of citations from articles in journal i to articles in journal j. The
total number of articles cited by articles in journal i is denoted by li =
∑
j∈M li,j. Setting
pi,j = li,j/li induces the stochastic matrix P with the following interpretation: Imagine
a researcher who is currently reading an article from journal i ∈ M . The matrix P then
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indicates which journal the researcher is going to read next (following some citation from
the current article).23 If the probability that the random–walk continues after the first
step is 0 ≤ α < 1 — the interpretation of α is akin to that in the model of residential
segregation —, the matrix Q = (1− α) (I− αP)−1P can be derived in exactly the same
way as before. In particular, qi,j corresponds to the probability that the researcher stops
at journal j given that her random–walk started at journal i.
Given the tuple C = 〈N,M,G, (ng,i)g∈G,i∈M ,P〉 and the continuation probability α ∈
[0, 1), the segregation index σg(C, α) of field g ∈ G measures the probability that a
researcher who starts reading a randomly chosen article from a journal from field g (that
is, each journal i from field g is taken with probability dg,i) and follows the citations
therein, stops reading an article from a journal that also belongs to field g ∈ G. Formally,
by Proposition 3, σg(C, α) = w
T
gPcg, where wg is the PageRank vector of field g.
5.2.2 Results
We use citation data from the 2010 Journal Citation Reports for a five year window. It
includes citations made in 2010 to articles published in 2005–2009. The set M consists of
140 leading Economics journals according to the measures of Impact FactorTM and Article
InfluenceTM. We classify the journals in 18 fields following the CEFAFE–EU ranking from
the University of E´vora, Portugal (see, Table 4).24
[Include Table 4 about here]
For each of the 18 fields, we compute both the homophily index hg(C) = σg(C, 0),
which indicates the percentage of citations that stay within a field, and the segregation
index σg(C, 0.85). The results are presented in Table 5.
23Modelling citation patterns using transition matrices is standard in the litera-
ture. See, for instance, Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004), and impact measures like
EigenfactorTM, Article InfluenceTM and SCImago Journal Rank.
24http://www.cefage.uevora.pt/en/links/revistas cientificas rankings.
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[Include Table 5 about here]
One can see that the size dependent measures hg(C) and σg(C, 0.85) yield very similar
results. In fact, the set of the five most segregated fields is identical in both cases, and the
corresponding rank correlation is very high (0.942). Also, these two rankings resemble
very much the ranking that one obtains if the fields are simply ordered according to their
relatives sizes. One should look at the normalized measures to filter out this effect.
The last two columns show that the set of the five most segregated fields is still very
much the same for both indices, however there are important changes with respect to the
non–normalized measures. For the non–normalized measures, General Economic, which
contains all general interest journals and is with 33 journals by far the biggest field, is
among the most segregated fields. Yet, it is far less segregated for the normalized mea-
sures, which intuitively makes sense. Similarly, Economic History is not much segregated
for the size dependent measures but by far the most segregated field if the normalized
measures are applied. Also note that the rank correlation between the normalized ho-
mophily index and the normalized segregation index for α = 0.85 is 0.554. This shows
that there is some clustering beyond immediate neighbors that is explained by the segre-
gation index σ: Even if a journal from field g does not cite a journal from the same field,
it may cite journals from other fields that usually cite journals from g.
This type of higher order clustering is exactly captured by the difference between
h¯g(C) and σ¯g(C, 0.85), and it is this difference that allows us to uncover some interest-
ing citation patterns. For example, concentrating on the four small fields with a very
low normalized homophily index — AccAud, HRM, Sector, and Socio —, one sees that
σ¯g(C, 0.85)− h¯g(C) is large for Sector and AccAud but low for HRM and Socio. Hence,
while neither of these four fields has many self citations, there are cycles for Sector and
AccAud (these journals cite journals from other fields that then cite back) that do not oc-
cur to this large extent for HRM and Socio. Also, these are the only four fields for which
the segregation raises as the expected walk length increases, which makes us conclude
that these kind of cycles play only a minor/no importance in the other fields.
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Among the fields that reduce their segregation when indirect citations are taken into
account, General Economics (GenEcon) and Urban, Spatial, Regional, and Transport
Economics (UrbSpaReg) deserve some special attention. While GenEcon does not show
any network effects (the normalized fraction of field–self–citations is in both cases 1.6
times larger than that obtained from the uniform distribution), UrbSpaReg turns out
to have a lot of field–self–citations (roughly 11 times more if compared to the uniform
distribution), yet this fraction is reduced by 75% when indirect citations are considered
as well. So, journals from other fields that are cited by UrbSpaReg do not have the
tendency to cite back. This is to say that UrbSpaReg has a rather high homophily index
but a normalized segregation index when α = 0.85 that compares to that of many other
fields.
6 A Model of Time Investment
We now adapt the model of Currarini et al. (2009) to show that the segregation index
σg is directly related to the equilibrium outcome of a game in which individuals have to
decide how to spend their time.25 We depart from the spatial network defined through
the matrix A on the set of nodesM = {1, 2, . . . , m}. We assume that A is symmetric and
that ai > 0. There is a set of groups/cultures G. At each moment in time, a continuum
of individuals of mass ng,i of group g ∈ G arrives (is born) in neighborhood i ∈ M . We
say that an individual is an i−citizen if she is born in neighborhood i, and a g−member
if she belongs to group g.
Each individual decides how much time to invest in meeting other cultures. We
consider an unbiased payoff function that does not depend on the type of the individual
so that we can identify how the spatial setting alone shapes separation in equilibrium.
Thus, let tg,i ≥ 0 be the time invested by an i−citizen in culture g ∈ G, independently
of her group. The total time invested by an i−citizen is ti =
∑
g∈G tg,i. It is the time an
25Alternatively, one could also follow an axiomatic approach to rationalize the measure.
See, Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) and Frankel and Volij (2010) for related examples.
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individual from neighborhood i spends in the matching process, interacting with other
citizens who also invest time. After time ti expires, the i−citizen exits the process.
Meetings between individuals are only possible if they live in neighboring census
tracts. In particular, an i−citizen meets a j−citizen with probability pi,j = ai,j/ai; that
is, the transition probability is uniform. For all neighborhoods i, j ∈ M and all groups
g, s, u ∈ G, we write [(i, g) → (j, s)]u to denote the event in which an i−citizen who
invests in culture g meets a j−citizen who is an u−member and invests in culture s.
Note that the neighborhoods i and j, or the groups g, s and u may coincide or not. A
mutual–interest–based meeting of an i−citizen with a j−citizen (I–meeting from now on)
is a meeting of the form [(i, g) → (j, g)]
q
; that is, an i−citizen meets a j−citizen, and
they are investing in the same culture. Let τ gi,j be the total time an i−citizen spends in
I–meetings related to culture g with j−citizens. A cultural meeting of an i−citizen with
a j−citizen (C–meeting from now on) is a meeting of the form [(i, g) → (j, q )]g; that is,
an i−citizen who invests in culture g meets a j−citizen who is a g−member. Let τ¯ gi,j be
the total time an i−citizen spends in C–meetings with j−citizens who are g−members.
Finally, note that the meeting [(i, g)→ (j, g)]g is both I and C.
We assume that individuals only benefit from meetings that are I or C. First, the
i−citizen gets A1 ≥ 0 for each unit of time in the I–meeting [(i, g) → (j, g)]
q
. Second,
each unit of time in the C–meeting [(i, g)→ (j, q )]g produces a benefit of A0 > 0 for the
i−citizen. In case a meeting is both I and C, the i–citizen gets A0 +A1 per unit of time
in the meeting. The total benefits of an i−citizen are then equal to
Bi ((tg,j)g∈G,j∈M) =
∑
g∈G
∑
j∈M
(
A0 τ¯
g
i,j + A1 τ
g
i,j
)
.
Costs are supposed to be additively separable with respect to the time spent in the
different cultures. Also, they are identical for all cultures and independent of the group:
Ci((tg,i)g∈G) =
D
2
∑
g∈G
t2g,i,
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where D > 0. The utility of an i−citizen is then
Ui ((tg,j)g∈G,j∈M) =
∑
g∈G
(
Ao
∑
j∈M
τ¯ gi,j + A1
∑
j∈M
τ gi,j
)
−
D
2
∑
g∈G
t2g,i.
One sees that the incentives to express interest in a particular culture g are determined
by three factors: The likelihood of meeting an g−member (the compositional effect that
produces a payoff of A0), the chance of finding other citizens who are also interested in
culture g (the complementarity effect that produces a payoff of A1), and the parameter
D of the cost function. Next, and in order to be able to calculate the total time spent in
different meetings, we have to make some assumptions on the probability that a partic-
ular meeting occurs. We follow Currarini et al. (2009) and impose an unbiased process.
Formally, the probability ρgi,j that an i−citizen has an I−meeting related to culture g
with a j−citizen is
ρgi,j ≡ pi,j
pj,i (nj tg,j)
pj,i
∑
k∈G
nj tk,j
= pi,j
tg,j
tj
;
that is, the probability is determined by the fraction of time j−citizens spend in culture
g. Similarly, the probability ρ¯gi,j that an i−citizen has a C−meeting with an g−member
from neighborhood j is driven by the size of group g at j:
ρ¯gi,j ≡ pi,j
pj,i (ng,j tj)
pj,i (nj tj)
= pi,j
ng,j
nj
= pi,j cg,j.
We then find that τ gi,j = ρ
g
i,j · tg,i = pi,j · tg,i · tg,j · 1/tj and τ¯
g
i,j = ρ¯
g
i,j · tg,i = pi,j · tg,i · cg,j ,
respectively. Using this information, the utility function of an i−citizen becomes
Ui ((tg,j)g∈G,j∈M) =
∑
g∈G
(
Ao tg,i
∑
j∈M
pi,j cg,j + A1 tg,i
∑
j∈M
pi,j
tg,j
tj
)
−
D
2
∑
g∈G
t2g,i. (1)
We study the simultaneous move game with utilities given by (1) and where each
i−citizen chooses the investment times (tg,i)g∈G ≥ 0. Given the investment times from
all individuals, the resulting meetings are balanced if the following three conditions are
satisfied:
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• Total balancedness: The time i−citizens meet j−citizens is equal to the time
j−citizens meet i−citizens.
• I–balancedness: The time i−citizens have I−meetings related to culture g with
j−citizens is equal to the time j−citizens have I−meetings related to culture g
with i−citizens.
• C–balancedness: The time i−citizens have C−meetings with g−members from node
j is equal to the time that g−members from node j spend in these meetings with
i−citizens.
Balancedness states that every i−citizen who invests ti units of time has bilateral
meetings during this time. Due to the unbiased setting, all three conditions are equivalent
and reduce to ni · pi,j · ti = nj · pj,i · tj (for details, see the proof of Theorem 1). It is
also important to note that balancedness can only be ensured in equilibrium if we impose
some additional restrictions on the structure of the network. For this reason, we assume
from now on that for all i, j ∈ M , ni/nj = ai/aj ; that is, in relative terms, the mass of
newborns in neighborhood i ∈M is proportional to its number of neighbors ai. Only then
meetings with all neighbors are feasible. We nevertheless point out that this condition
still gives us the freedom to choose any vectors of group concentrations (cg)g∈G.
We say that (t∗g,i)i∈M,g∈G is a steady state equilibrium if (t
∗
g,i)i∈M,g∈G is a Nash equilib-
rium of the simultaneous move game, meetings are balanced, and the inflow and outflow
of individuals are equal at any given point in time. The following result states that in
the unique steady state equilibrium, the average time invested by g−members in their
own culture, t¯g, is proportional to the segregation index of group g.
Theorem 1. For all groups g ∈ G,
t¯g ≡
1
ng
∑
i∈M
ng,i t
∗
g,i =
A0 + A1
D
σg
(
C,
A1
A0 + A1
)
.
Proof. See the corresponding section.
Observe that the relative magnitude of A1/A0 directly relates to the parameter α.
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As α increases in the model of residential segregation, the complementarity effect in the
game becomes stronger. We conclude with an example.
Example. Consider the city depicted in Figure 11.
[Include Figure 11 about here]
There are four neighborhoods and two groups. It is assumed that for all i ∈ M ,
ai,i = 1. The vectors of group concentration are equal to c
T
blacks = (0, 1, 1, 0) and c
T
whites =
(1, 0, 0, 1). Since the steady state equilibrium is only balanced if the condition ni/nj =
ai/aj is met for all i, j ∈ M , we consider the arrival rates n1 = n2 = 3, n3 = 4, and
n4 = 2. Hence, in Figure 11 each dot indicates a continuum of individuals of mass 1.
Also, dTblacks = (0, 3/7, 4/7, 0) and d
T
whites = (3/5, 0, 0, 2/5). If A0 = 1, A1 = 3, and
D = 2, then α = 0.75. In this case, the total time invested in the steady state is t∗i = 2
for all i ∈M , and the average equilibrium investments are twice the segregation indices:
t¯blacks = 2 σblacks(C, 0.75) = 1.17 and t¯
whites = 2 σwhites(C, 0.75) = 0.83.
26
Theorem 1 allows us to interpret the segregation index as the result of a game where
individuals benefit from meetings. In the example, the blacks are more segregated because
of the following game–theoretical interpretation. First, a black is more likely to meet
blacks since the group is rather clustered (hblacks = 4/7). Second, also a white is more
likely to meet a black (hwhites = 2/5). This higher chance of meeting blacks for all
individuals increases the compositional incentives to spend time with blacks. Third,
complementarities further increase the incentives to spend time in black–related meetings.
Finally, we also find that the whites spend more time in black–related than in white–
related meetings (1.16 vs. 0.83). This is not surprising in a theoretical framework where
individuals do not have any bias towards their own culture. 
26The latter equations can be verified with the help of the proof of Theorem 1.
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7 Conclusion
We have developed a new measure of residential segregation. In our theoretical model,
the nodes of a network represent neighborhoods or census tracts, and links indicate
which census tracts are adjacent in the urban space. It has also been assumed that
multiple individuals from possibly different social groups can be located in the very same
node. Using this information as the only primitive of our analysis, we have studied the
following process: In the first period, an individual moves from her area of residence to a
neighboring node. In each subsequent period, the individual advances from her current
position in the network to an adjacent node with a given probability, or the process
stops otherwise. The segregation index has then been defined as the probability that a
randomly chosen individual from a given group meets an individual from the same social
group in the node where her random–walk terminates.
We have shown in our analysis that the segregation index has several favorable as-
pects. First, the measure reduces to the isolation index in case the network is empty.
Consequently, the segregation index can be interpreted as a natural generalization of the
isolation index to spatial networks. Second, in case the network is not empty and the
exogenous probability that the random–walk stops is one, the only interactions that are
taken into account are those between nodes that are direct neighbors, and the segregation
index reduces to the homophily index introduced by Currarini et al. (2009). Third, the
segregation index incorporates the idea that social groups that are located closer to the
(relative) city center are more segregated everything else equal. In particular, the segre-
gation index turns out to be proportional to the PageRank index applied by Google to
determine the importance of webpages in the World Wide Web. Finally, the segregation
index is a continuous function in the social ties. Indeed, the SSI suggested by Echenique
and Fryer (2007), who have been the first to study a graph–theoretical model to develop
a measure of segregation, fails to satisfy this important criterion.
In our empirical analysis, we have studied first the Spanish 2009 census tract data.
The main result in this regard is that the province of Almeria on the Mediterranean
coast is the most segregated area, mainly because two of the more segregated groups, the
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Romanians and the Morrocans, are highly overrepresented in these regions. Immigrants
from Latin America, on the other hand, turn out to be very much integrated, an effect
that may be related to the fact that these groups speak Spanish natively. We have also
seen that clustering effects are important to understand the segregation of some of the
some smaller nationalities like the Pakistanis and immigrants from African countries like
Nigeria and Senegal, but not for the European communities.
Afterwards, we have indicated that our model residential segregation can be easily
adapted to answer a wide range of empirical questions. To illustrate this, we have cal-
culated the segregation of 18 different fields in Economics using citation data from 140
scientific publications. The difference between the normalized homophily index and the
normalized segregation index found in the data indicates a substantial amount of higher–
order clustering: Journals from field g may not cite journals from the same field but
journals from another field that cite journals from g.
Finally, in the last section of the paper, we rationalized the segregation index from
a game–theoretical point of view. We considered a model in which individuals arrive
continuously at the nodes of an exogenous network and have to decide how much time to
invest in the different groups/cultures (stay in the matching process). Using an unbiased
utility function, we found that the average amount of time an individual from group g
invests in her own culture is directly proportional to segregation index.
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Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider qi,j , which is the probability that a walk starting at node i ends at node j. With
probability (1 − α) the walk has length one, and it will end at node j with probability
pi,j. With probability α, the walk continues following i’s neighbors and it will reach node
j with probability
∑
k∈M pi,k qk,j. Thus, qi,j = (1 − α)pi,j + α
∑
k∈M pi,k qk,j. Rewriting
these equations in matrix form yields Q = (1 − α)P + αPQ, which is equivalent to
Q = (1− α)(I− αP)−1P, where the inverse (I− αP)−1 is well-defined and non-negative
because P ≥ 0 and α ∈ [0, 1).
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Proof of Proposition 2
Note first that σg(C, 0) = d
T
gPcg. Hence, we show that hg(C) = d
T
gPcg. By definition of
the homophily index,
hg(C) =
∑
i∈M
dg,i
∑
j∈M
ai,j ng,j∑
k∈M ai,k nk
=
∑
i∈M
dg,i
∑
j∈M
ai,jnj∑
k∈M ai,knk
cg,j
=
∑
i∈M
dg,i
∑
j∈M
pi,j cg,j
= dTgPcg.
This concludes the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3
By Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 , σg(C, α) = (d
T
gM)Pcg, where M = (1− α)(I− αP)
−1.
Hence, it only remains to be shown that wg = M
Tdg = (1 − α)(I − αP
T)−1dg. By
definition, wg is equal to the principal eigenvector of the matrix S = (1−α)dg1
T+αPT.
Since S is column stochastic, its spectral radius is 1 and the principal eigenvector wg
satisfies the equation Swg = wg. Taking a wg whose coordinates sum up to 1, we get that
(1−α)dg+αP
Twg = wg. Solving this equation we get that wg = (1−α)(I−αP
T)−1dg.
Proof of Proposition 4
Since P = I for the isolation index Ig(C) (see section 3.1), normalized segregation is
σ¯g(C, α) = (ng/n)
−1Ig(C) = (ng/n)
−1
∑
i∈M
dg,i cg,i = n
∑
i∈M
1
ni
d2g,i.
The sum of squares is minimized if dg,i = ni/n for all i ∈M . Thus,
σ¯g(C, α) ≥ n
∑
i∈M
1
ni
n2i
n2
=
∑
i∈M
ni
n
= 1.
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This concludes the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Theorem 1
The proof is organized as follows. First, we show existence of a steady state equilibrium
and relate it to the segregation index. Afterwards, we establish the uniqueness of the
equilibrium. Finally, we prove matching balancedness.
1) Existence
Take any time investments (tg,i)i∈M,g∈G. Using the utility function (1), one sees that
the marginal utility of the time investment tg,i in culture g of an individual born in
neighborhood i equals
∂Ui
∂tg,i
= A0
∑
j∈M
pi,jcg,j + A1
∑
j∈M
pi,j
tg,j
tj
−D tg,i. (2)
In order to prove existence, we derive an equilibrium where ∂Ui/∂tg,i = 0. We will show
first that the total time efforts are equal for all individuals; that is, in this equilibrium,
individuals will only differ in the way they distribute their time over all cultures. Summing
over all groups and recalling that
∑
g∈G cg,j = 1 for all j ∈ M and
∑
j∈M pi,j = 1, we
have that A0 + A1 −D ti = 0. It follows then that for all i ∈ M ,
t∗i =
A0 + A1
D
. (3)
Now, we are going to determine the time spent in g−related meetings. Let tg = (tg,i)i∈M
be the vector of times spent in culture g ∈ G. Using equation (3), the first order conditions
can be rewritten in matrix form as
A0
D
Pcg +
A1
A0 + A1
Ptg − tg = 0.
It follows that
t∗g =
A0
D
(
I−
A1
A0 + A1
P
)−1
Pcg ≥ 0.
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The non–negativity of t∗g follows from the fact that the inverse exists and that it is non–
negative (remember that P is stochastic and that 0 ≤ A1/(A0 + A1) < 1). Hence, t
∗
g is
the unique equilibrium satisfying ∂Ui/∂tg,i = 0 for all i ∈M and g ∈ G.
Next, we will will relate the equilibrium time investments to the segregation in-
dex. Recall that the vector of local segregations vg for the continuation probability
α = A1/(A0 + A1) is defined as
vg =
A0
A0 + A1
(
I−
A1
A0 + A1
P
)−1
Pcg.
Consequently,
t∗g =
A0 + A1
D
vg.
Finally, the average time investment in culture g by members of group g is
t¯g ≡
1
ng
∑
i∈M
ng,i t
∗
g,i =
∑
i∈M
dg,i t
∗
g,i =
A0 + A1
D
∑
i∈M
dg,i vg,i =
A0 + A1
D
σg
(
C,
A1
A0 + A1
)
.
This concludes the first part of the proof.
2) Uniqueness
In any equilibrium, ∂Ui/∂tg,i ≤ 0 for all i ∈ M and g ∈ G, with strict inequality only if
t∗g,i = 0. We show that ∂Ui/∂tg,i = 0. Suppose, by contradiction, that ∂Ui/∂tg,i < 0 for
some i ∈M and g ∈ G. Then, t∗g,i = 0 and it follows from equation (2) that
A0
∑
j∈M
pi,jcg,j + A1
∑
j∈M
pi,j
tg,j
tj
< 0.
However, this cannot hold because all values in the equation are non–negative by defini-
tion. Hence, ∂Ui/∂tg,i = 0, and the unique equilibrium is the one calculated in the first
part of the proof. This concludes the second part of the proof.
3) Balancedness
The balancedness conditions can be written formally as:
• Total balancedness. For all i, j ∈M , ni · ti · pi,j = nj · tj · pj,i.
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• I–balancedness. For all i, j ∈ M and g ∈ G, ni·pi,j ·tg,i·tg,j ·1/tj = nj ·pj,i·tg,j ·tg,i·1/ti,
which is equivalent to ni · ti · pi,j = nj · tj · pj,i.
• C–balancedness. For all i, j ∈M and g ∈ G, ni ·pi,j · tg,i · cg,j = ng,j · tj ·pj,i · tg,i ·1/ti,
which is equivalent to ni · ti·i,j = nj · tj · pj,i.
The three conditions are therefore equivalent, and we only have to show that ni t
∗
i pi,j =
nj t
∗
j pj,i. Using that ai/aj = ni/nj by assumption, t
∗
i = t
∗
j , and pij = 1/ai, we obtain that
pi,j
pj,i
=
1/ai
1/aj
=
aj
ai
=
nj
ni
=
nj
ni
t∗j
t∗i
.
This concludes the proof of the Theorem.
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Figure 1: Calculation of the segregation index.
City B 
ﬀ
1
◦
◦ 
ﬀ
2
•
• 
ﬀ
3
◦
◦ 
ﬀ
4
◦
◦ 
ﬀ
5
•
•
City A 
ﬀ
1
◦
◦ 
ﬀ
2
◦
◦ 
ﬀ
3
◦
◦ 
ﬀ
4
•
• 
ﬀ
5
•
•
Figure 2: Clustering.
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Figure 5: Calculation of the SSI .
Figure 6: Normalized segregation in Spain by provinces as of January 2009 for α = 0.85
and a neighborhood radius of 400 meters. The names of the different provinces can be
identified with the help of Table 3.
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Figure 7: Normalized segregation in Spain by groups as of January 2009 for α = 0.85 and
a neighborhood radius of 400 meters. The ordering of the different groups corresponds
to that in Table 2.
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Figure 8: Network effects (in proportions) in Spain by groups as of January 2009 for a
neighborhood radius of 400 meters. The ordering of the different groups corresponds to
that in Table 2.
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Figure 9: Proportion of the network effect that is due to connections beyond immediate
neighbors in Spain by groups as of January 2009 for a neighborhood radius of 400 meters.
The ordering of the different groups corresponds to that in Table 2.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
E BU F I PO P RU R UC ARMA NI SE A BO B CO CU CH EC PA PE RD UR VE C PK
Figure 10: Correlation between σg(C, 0.85) and the SSI in Spain by groups as of January
2009 for a neighborhood radius of 400 meters. The ordering of the different groups
corresponds to that in Table 2.
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Figure 11: Connections and arrival rates.
Components Blacks SSI
City 1
Component 1 (B,1) (B,2) (C,1) (C,2) (D,1) (D,2) (D,3) (D,4)
0.87 0.62 1.26 0.92 0.93 0.75 0.29 0.10 0.72
Component 2 (B,5) (C,5)
0.25 0.25 0.25
Weighted Average 0.63
City 2
Component (B,1) (B,2) (C,1) (C,2) (D,1) (D,2) (D,3) (D,4) (B,5) (C,5)
1.09 0.78 1.58 1.14 1.16 0.93 0.37 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.72
Table 1: Calculation of the SSI .
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Nationality ID Number of Residents Share
Spain E 40,956,149 90.26%
Europe
Bulgaria BU 164,716 0.36%
France F 120,262 0.27%
Italy I 175,232 0.39%
Poland PO 85,007 0.19%
Portugal P 140,801 0.31%
Romania RU 798,869 1.76%
Russia R 47,428 0.10%
Ukraine UC 82,263 0.18%
Africa
Algeria AR 56,194 0.12%
Morocco MA 708,939 1.56%
Nigeria NI 42,322 0.09%
Senegal SE 56,589 0.12%
South America
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Argentina A 142,239 0.31%
Bolivia BO 230,693 0.51%
Brazil B 126,172 0.28%
Colombia CO 296,619 0.65%
Cuba CU 54,598 0.12%
Chile CH 51,032 0.10%
Ecuador EC 421,385 0.93%
Paraguay PA 81,549 0.18%
Peru PE 139,167 0.31%
Dominican Republic RD 88,102 0.19%
Uruguay UR 50,422 0.11%
Venezuela VE 61,448 0.14%
Asia
China C 147,373 0.32%
Pakistan PK 54,100 0.12%
Table 2: Residents in Spain as of January 2009 according
to the country of origin (nationality). The data is made
available by the National Statistical Institute (INE) of
Spain.
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Number Name Number Name Number Name
01 A´lava 02 Albacete 03 Alicante
04 Almer´ıa 05 A´vila 06 Badajoz
07 Baleares 08 Barcelona 09 Burgos
10 Ca´ceres 11 Ca´diz 12 Castello´n
13 Ciudad Real 14 Co´rdoba 15 Cuenca
16 Corun˜a 17 Girona 18 Granada
19 Guadalajara 20 Guipu´zca 21 Huelva
22 Huesca 23 Jae´n 24 Leo´n
25 Le´rida 26 Rioja 27 Lugo
28 Madrid 29 Ma´laga 30 Murcia
31 Navarra 32 Orense 33 Asturias
34 Palencia 35 Palmas 36 Pontevedra
37 Salamanca 38 Santa Cruz 39 Cantabria
40 Segovia 41 Sevilla 42 Soria
43 Tarragona 44 Teruel 45 Toledo
46 Valencia 47 Valladolid 48 Vizcaya
49 Zamora 50 Zaragoza
Table 3: Idenfication of provinces.
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Field ID Full Name
AccAud Accounting and Auditing
AgrEnvEn Agricultural, Environmental and Energy Economics
DevTrans Development and Transition Economics
EconStat Econometrics and Statistics Applied to Economics
FinIns Finance and Insurance
GenEcon General Economics
HistPolMet History of Economic Thought, Political Economy, Methodology
HRM Human Resource Management and Industrial Relations
InnovEntrSB Innovation, Entrepreneurship, Small Business
IO Industrial Organization, Productivity Analysis
LaborHealth Labor, Education, Population and Health Economics
Law Law and Economics
Macro Macroeconomics, International and Monetary Economics
PubEcon Public Economics, Public Choice
Sector Sectorial Studies
Socio Social Economics, Political Science, Philosophy, Sociology, International Relations
Theory Economic Theory, Game and Decision Theory
UrbSpaReg Urban, Spatial, Regional and Transport Economics
Table 4: Field abbreviations in the citation model using the CEFAGE–EU ranking from
the University of E´vora, Portugal.
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Field ID # Journals ng/n hg(C) σg(C, 0.85) h¯g(C) σ¯g(C, 0.85)
AccAud 1 0.004 (17) 0.000 (17) 0.011 (14) 0.000 (16) 2.617 (6)
AgrEnvEn 17 0.120 (2) 0.530 (2) 0.163 (5) 4.414 (9) 1.358 (14)
DevTrans 11 0.062 (7) 0.341 (7) 0.118 (7) 5.468 (7) 1.887 (9)
EconStat 9 0.055 (8) 0.474 (5) 0.164 (4) 8.636 (3) 2.983 (4)
FinIns 11 0.094 (3) 0.691 (1) 0.351 (2) 7.356 (4) 3.742 (3)
GenEcon 33 0.288 (1) 0.479 (4) 0.458 (1) 1.662 (14) 1.589 (12)
HistPolMet 3 0.011 (13) 0.365 (6) 0.084 (9) 31.999 (1) 7.343 (1)
HRM 1 0.004 (17) 0.000 (17) 0.001 (18) 0.000 (16) 0.170 (18)
InnovEntrSB 2 0.009 (14) 0.036 (13) 0.009 (15) 4.097 (11) 1.054 (16)
IO 6 0.032 (10) 0.193 (11) 0.061 (10) 5.799 (6) 1.846 (10)
LaborHealth 11 0.079 (4) 0.528 (3) 0.207 (3) 6.672 (5) 2.622 (5)
Law 2 0.006 (15) 0.029 (14) 0.012 (13) 4.306 (10) 1.741 (11)
Macro 10 0.074 (5) 0.222 (10) 0.111 (8) 3.000 (12) 1.497 (13)
PubEcon 5 0.049 (9) 0.121 (12) 0.051 (12) 2.575 (12) 1.095 (15)
Sector 1 0.001 (18) 0.000 (17) 0.004 (17) 0.000 (16) 3.927 (2)
Socio 3 0.016 (12) 0.001 (15) 0.007 (16) 0.001 (15) 0.411 (17)
Theory 9 0.070 (6) 0.331 (8) 0.143 (6) 4.749 (8) 2.057 (8)
UrbSpaReg 5 0.024 (11) 0.264 (9) 0.059 (11) 10.982 (2) 2.467 (7)
Table 5: Field, number of journals per field, article shares, homophily index (non–
normalized and normalized), and segregation index (non–normalized and normalized)
for 18 different areas in Economics using the citation data from 2010 for 140 economics
journals. In parentheses, we present the corresponding ordinal rankings.
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